BOND QUESTIONS AIR FORCE TANKER DEAL
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March 7, 2008
WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senator Kit Bond sent a letter today to Lt. General McKinley, Director of the Air National Guard, questioning the Air Force’s decision-making process in awarding the KC-X tanker contract to Northrop-Grumman-EADS instead of Boeing. The full text of the letter follows:
LTG Craig Mckinley
Director, ANG
Dear LTG McKinley:
As you are aware, the Pentagon’s recent award to the Northrop - Grumman - EADS joint venture to supply tankers to the Air Force has generated a significant amount of interest.
In a story in the Mobile (AL) Press-Register, March 2, 2008 entitled “Weapons Chief Praises Tanker Selection Process,” the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, John Young, indicated that the Air Force “did its homework, and did it well” in selecting Northrop Grumman Corp. for the proposed $40 billion tanker contract over a rival bid from Boeing Co.
Despite Young’s claims to the Press-Register, I have serious concerns with the Air Force’s decision-making process. Reports to my office indicate that the Air Force failed to consult substantively with Air National Guard leaders of the 20 states where tanker assets are assigned on the KC-X tanker solicitation. This included, but was not limited to, a failure to conduct site assessment surveys to determine the impact of the KC-X tanker on future Air National Guard operations and military construction requirements.
My staff has been informed that the military construction costs for the Airbus will be so significant that Air National Guard units cannot realistically expect replacement aircraft once their legacy tanker assets are retired. The impact on the 20 states and the Air National Guard assets assigned is so significant that it is imperative that Congressional leaders examine the long term ramifications to the national security interests of the nation.
In anticipation of a U.S. Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Hearing with the Air Force leaders scheduled for March 12, 2008 please provide my office with answers to the following questions:
I. To what extent, if any, did Air Force leaders or staff enter into substantive discussions about the impact of the KC-X solicitation to the Air National Guard units where tanker assets are presently assigned?
II. To what extent, if any, were site assessment surveys conducted to determine the impact of the selection of the KC-X tanker to future Air National Guard operations? As most of the ANG tanker units reside on civilian airfields, of particular interest is what analysis was conducted at each location to assess the suitability of the common-use civilian airport infrastructure to support KC-X operations.
III. To what extent, if any, were military construction estimates generated to determine the military construction costs necessary to house the KC-X replacement tanker?
IV. Please provide the best estimate possible of the cost(s) associated with basing the Airbus tanker and the Boeing tanker at the 20 Air National Guard sites where tanker assets are currently based?
Your input will provide valuable insights for Congressional leaders and assist us in determining if the Pentagon’s selection process was appropriate or flawed because of the absence of metrics designed to determine the impact on the Air National Guard force, which constitutes 41 percent of the air refueling tanker inventory.
Sincerely,
Christopher S. Bond
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